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3Help Yourself
Recent Trends in African Peacekeeping in Africa
Nikolas EmmaNuEl, PhD*
In recent years, the international community has asked a small number of African subregional hegemonic states to put into place regional and subre-gional security infrastructures.1 However, these African security organiza-tions are not being pulled together in response either to interstate conflict or 
an external threat, both of which are frequently the primary motivations for form-
ing regional security complexes.2 Instead, some African states are trying to coun-
teract externalities from domestic threats emanating from civil wars and state 
crises in neighboring countries, primarily in their subregions. The interventions by 
Ethiopia or Kenya across their borders into Somalia illustrate this point. Security 
efforts in Africa are primarily driven by such spillover effects (e.g., refugees, insur-
gent groups, illegal commerce, etc.).3 As Edmond Keller clearly indicates, “do-
mestic insecurity in one state has a high potential to have a destabilizing effect in 
neighboring states.”4 The African states that intervene do so frequently in reaction 
to these externalities. Yet, the capacity to respond is not evenly distributed in Af-
rica south of the Sahara.5 Some states are more capable than others.
This article argues that an “African solution” to the problems of civil wars and 
state crises on the continent has crystallized around a small handful of subregional 
hegemonic powers. Multilateral peacekeeping in Africa is an excellent indicator 
of state strength and capacity. Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Uganda, to 
name several key actors, all have militaries capable of undertaking the deployment 
of troops around their subregions and, in some cases, beyond. The international 
community would like these stronger states to form the backbone of conflict-
management efforts in the region and send their troops as part of an African se-
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curity infrastructure. In return, these emerging subregional hegemons gain inter-
national legitimacy and respect as well as foreign economic and military assistance, 
along with pay and training for their armed forces. Furthermore, and understand-
ably, these benefits actually serve to reinforce and enhance the material standing 
and hegemonic status of these pivotal states. At the root of these reactions, how-
ever, is the realization that Africans are being asked with greater frequency to help 
themselves in security matters.
Donald Rothchild points out that in regard to Africa, the “relatively better-
functioning states are increasingly viewing some type of self-help as essential to 
reduce threats from violence.”6 Regardless of the French or United Nations (UN) 
interventions on the continent, Rothchild’s observation remains highly relevant. 
This is why we currently see a number of the relatively stronger subregional hege-
mons spearheading interventions into Africa’s civil conflicts. They are the most 
willing and the most able to construct some sort of subregional and regional se-
curity infrastructure. Francis Deng provides a more detailed analysis of this real-
ity:
Regions generally are organized around certain states that have the power and position 
potentially to play the role of hegemon or act as a pole around which the security or in-
security of other states revolves. The “core state” in each regional constellation possesses 
key assets in the form of geographical position, military, economic, political and diplo-
matic resources, and recognition as a regional leader. A large and powerful state inevitably 
compels its neighbors to shape their security policies, and to conceive of conflict manage-
ment, with reference to itself.7
Yet, for all of their potential, most of the critical state actors in Africa simply 
need the financial and operational capabilities to respond meaningfully to armed 
conflict across the region. Consequently, this article addresses two important 
questions:
1. What are the advantages and drawbacks of relying on African troops as
peacekeepers in Africa?
2. Who are the subregional hegemons, and how much are they contributing to
the construction of a security infrastructure in Africa?
State Crises and Civil Conflicts in Africa
It became apparent early in the post–Cold War period that a growing trend 
of intrastate conflicts was emerging in Africa. Since 1989 a large number of states 
have experienced significant crises in sub-Saharan Africa, and the international 
response has been mixed. Indeed, a significant number of these state crises under-
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went external military intervention organized by a wide variety of international 
actors including the UN, the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Commu-
nity, the United States, France, and the European Union, along with a number of 
unilateral missions by African states such as Angola.8 As of 2013, at least 10 se-
vere state crises were ongoing in Africa (table 1).
Table1. Ongoing African state crises / civil conflicts
Ongoing Crisis Start Date Military Intervention? 
Central African Republic Mar. 2003 Yes
Chad Oct. 2005
Congo-Kinshasa Mar. 1992 Yes
Ethiopia Jan. 2007
Mali Mar. 2012 Yes
Nigeria Jan. 2006
Somalia May 1988 Yes
South Sudan Jul. 2012 Yes
Sudan Jul. 1983 Yes
Sudan (Darfur) Feb. 2003 Yes
Source: “Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946–2013,” Center for Systemic Peace, http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist 
.htm; and “Opérations en cours,” Réseau de recherché sur les opérations de paix (ROP), Université de Montréal, accessed 2 
September 2014, http://www.operationspaix.net/operations-en-cours.html.
Seven of these 10 conflicts have some sort of multilateral organization sending 
troops to secure or keep the peace. Interestingly, African troops are strongly con-
tributing to all of these peacekeeping operations (PKO).
Chapter 8 of the UN Charter is an important element of arguments for the 
regionalization of peacekeeping and peacemaking in Africa. Clearly, Articles 52 
and 53 of the charter envision an important place for regional organizations in 
settling disputes. Chapter 8 also lays out legal groundwork for subcontracting the 
enforcement of peace under the authority of the UN Security Council. This idea 
has been used extensively in Africa since the early 1990s.
In building a case for this shift, former UN secretary-general Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali’s report An Agenda for Peace points out that the UN should more 
frequently rely upon regional security arrangements to relieve its increasingly 
heavy peacekeeping burden after the Cold War.9 After this general statement, 
French president François Mitterrand echoed a similar sentiment in November 
1994 (oddly enough, only a few months after the Rwandan genocide and the 
highly controversial Opération Turquoise) when he openly called for African 
states “to resolve their conflicts themselves and organise their own security.”10 By 
1995, after the debacles in Somalia and Rwanda, the report Improving Prepared-
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ness for Conflict Prevention and Peace-keeping in Africa allowed Boutros-Ghali to 
be even more specific about the importance of regional organizations in the ac-
tivities of the UN on the continent:
The founders of the United Nations, in Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Na-
tions, envisaged an important role for regional organizations in the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security. It is increasingly apparent that the United Nations cannot 
address every potential and actual conflict troubling the world. Regional or subregional 
organizations sometimes have a comparative advantage in taking the lead role in the 
prevention and settlement of conflicts and to assist the United Nations in containing 
them.11
No other region has experienced such a massive shift towards this method 
for peacekeeping. As Jonah Victor notes, “since the end of the Cold War, Sub-
Saharan Africa states have dramatically increased their participation in interna-
tional peacekeeping operations in Africa.”12 Most prominently, the Nigerian-led 
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) 
intervention into the Liberian civil war in August of 1990 represented an impor-
tant turning point in the construction of an African response to conflict on the 
continent. Since then, the vast majority of multilateral military interventions in 
sub-Saharan Africa have been undertaken with a significant number of African 
troops. Frequently these actions have occurred under African command and in-
creasingly under the auspices of an African organization. As Paul Williams indi-
cates, “African governments bear the primary responsibility” for dealing with and 
responding to the various conflicts on the continent.13 It may make some sense to 
increase Africans’ participation in activities such as peacekeeping on their own 
continent because it builds a sense of ownership and responsibility. Despite the 
advantages to such an arrangement, one must consider some important drawbacks 
as well.
Advantages and Disadvantages of 
Using African Troops in African Conflicts
The deployment of African troops in PKOs in the region has some signifi-
cant pluses over the use of extracontinental armed forces.14 Three reasons stand 
out: cultural and geographic proximity, the lower cost of responding, and the clear 
national interest in stabilizing one’s neighborhood and reducing the impact of 
externalities. First, subregional forces may have a better understanding of the con-
flicts in their own backyards. These actors enjoy a crucial advantage in that they 
often have direct superior knowledge of the cultures they are dealing with and the 
prevailing norms, as well as acceptable and unacceptable behaviors. This closeness 
 AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING 7
“provide[s] them with a better understanding of [a conflict’s] . . . dynamics, key 
players, and context-specific management and resolution options.”15 Thus, subre-
gional forces may be better received and accepted in nearby conflict zones. Yet, 
this is not always the case. The current crisis in the Central African Republic 
shows that bordering states such as Chad risk becoming too closely linked with 
the actors in a given conflict, undermining their impartiality. Second, geographic 
proximity should facilitate a much more rapid and less expensive response. Subre-
gional troops operating in neighboring countries do not need to be ferried across 
the planet. This advantage should lower operational costs considerably. Third, it 
makes sense that the leaders of states in the immediate vicinity of a civil war 
would view ending violence and restoring a functioning state as part of their di-
rect national interest. Extraregional states are not as directly affected by the exter-
nalities of civil wars outside their own neighborhoods. Therefore, regional inter-
veners should make a stronger commitment to remain in a neighboring country 
because it is in their national interest to do so.
Furthermore, being an active participant in PKOs in Africa and elsewhere 
could enhance national prestige in the eyes of the international community and 
increase the participating state’s leverage in regard to donors. The fact that troop-
contributing states appear to be upright international citizens, offering a critical 
public good, might also give them a larger voice than they would otherwise have. 
Perhaps this role could boost their clout in decision-making structures in interna-
tional bodies such as the UN. Furthermore, participation in such problematic 
places as Somalia gives intervening states like Uganda some sway over interna-
tional donors. This influence over foreign-aid donors became evident when Ugan-
dan president Yoweri Museveni recently announced that he would end the par-
ticipation of his country’s armed forces in the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) after a UN panel of experts indicated that Uganda was supplying 
weapons to the M23 rebel group in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC).16 Kampala expects special treatment in return for deploying significant 
numbers of Ugandan troops in Somalia.
Nonetheless, relying on African troops to intervene in civil conflicts on the 
continent presents other clear disadvantages. Perhaps most importantly, for all of 
their potential, the Africanization of PKOs leads to two fundamental problems: 
using the armed forces of states that lack military and economic capacity, and 
risking legitimacy and impartiality—witness the Chadian deployment as part of 
the current AU International Support Mission to the Central African Republic 
(MISCA).17
By far, the most obvious drawback to the use of African troops in peacekeep-
ing on the continent or anywhere else is their overall lack of resources. Many 
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African states simply cannot afford to fund their own military interventions 
abroad. Because of these financial constraints, armed forces in the region cannot 
commit meaningfully to conflict management and resolution through military 
means without significant outside assistance.18
African armed forces are severely constrained in the critical areas of training, 
sustained deployment, intelligence, transportation, and logistics, significantly un-
dermining the autonomy of African states and multilateral organizations to 
mount PKOs on their own. Rather, they are forced to rely on financial and mili-
tary aid from the international community. However, as John Prendergast notes, 
“the big money problem is that the Americans and the Europeans promised over 
the last decade that as long as the Africans deployed in these kinds of situations, 
we would pay for the soldiers and equip them. And we haven’t done it.”19
What motivates a state to participate in a PKO? It is hard to argue that 
neighbors will always be objective, neutral, and impartial. Mixed motives and real-
ist state interests can potentially overwhelm more altruistic, liberal desires to lend 
a helping hand in one’s neighborhood and to strengthen the overall international 
state system.20 Furthermore, geographical and cultural proximities might not al-
ways contribute to an intervention and legitimize an intervener’s behavior. As 
already indicated, the fact that a state is in the neighborhood does not mean that 
it is helping out in a benevolent manner. In fact, being from the neighborhood can 
become a significant drawback since local problems may directly involve the in-
tervening neighbor. At times, subregional forces can make a bad situation worse. 
Note four clear examples from recent history: Ethiopia, Angola, Rwanda, and 
Nigeria.
Ethiopia’s unilateral military incursion into Somalia, which began in 2006 to 
depose the Union of Islamic Courts, demonstrates that even actors with relatively 
large armed forces and international (i.e., United States) support can get bogged 
down by legitimacy problems. During its military interventions in Congo-Braz-
zaville in 1997, the DRC, or more recently in Guinea-Bissau, Angola acted uni-
laterally, normally taking military action outside any international, regional, or 
subregional infrastructure. Its unilateral behavior can undermine the perceived 
legitimacy of any action that Luanda takes. Rwanda is another very strong mili-
tary powerhouse emerging in the region. Over the past decade, Kigali has repeat-
edly contributed to multilateral PKOs across Africa. Rwanda has been a critical 
linchpin in the current hybrid AU/UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). However, 
at the same time, President Paul Kagame’s military forces have undermined sta-
bility in Central Africa by consistently arming and intervening on behalf of vari-
ous militia groups in the neighboring DRC. As Danielle Beswick points out, 
while Rwanda is contributing to “African solutions” in Darfur, it is also signifi-
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cantly adding to “Africa problems” in the DRC.21 This situation only underlines 
the problems of legitimacy and impartiality that local, neighboring states can run 
into when intervening militarily in their own region. Even internationally backed 
multilateral interventions can be dominated by a single state aiming to protect its 
own national interest.22 Nigeria’s lead in the intervention in Liberia as a part of 
ECOMOG comes to mind as a relatively successful subregional operation gener-
ally looked upon with respect by the international community. However, Nigeria 
was not impartial in Liberia. 23 The Nigerian military took sides and even directly 
armed rebel groups opposed to Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Libe-
ria.24 Furthermore, Nigeria’s intervention in Sierra Leone actually took place 
some three months before formal ECOWAS authorization.25 Such unilateral ac-
tion set a negative precedent for future peacekeeping missions.
Empirical Trends: 
Subregional Hegemons and African Peacekeeping
After examining the pluses and minuses of using African forces in multilat-
eral PKOs in Africa, one should look at the empirical realities and identify the 
states that are actually participating and doing the heavy lifting in their respective 
subregions. Table 2 details the current 10 PKOs involving troop deployments on 
the African continent and reveals the key African players involved in peacekeep-
ing there.
10    
Table 2. Current multilateral peacekeeping missions in sub-Saharan Africa (February 2014)
Operation Name 
(International 
Organization)
Beginning 
of Current 
Mission
Leading African Troop 
Contributors
Total Troop 
Deployment
Central African 
Republic MISCA (AU) Jun. 2013
Republic of Congo (864), 
Rwanda (850), Burundi (850), 
Chad (792)
 4,595
DRC MONUSCO (UN) Jul. 2010 South Africa (1,296), Tanzania (1,257), Malawi (854) 19,558
Côte d’Ivoire UNOCI (UN) Apr. 2004 Niger (871), Senegal (496), Togo (469)   7,957
Guinea-Bissau ECOMIB (ECOWAS) Apr. 2012
Nigeria (160), Burkina Faso 
(140)    300
Liberia UNMIL (UN) Sep. 2003 Nigeria (1,463), Ghana (709)   5,749
Mali MINUSMA (UN) Apr. 2013  Chad (1,142), Togo (939), Niger (865), Burkina Faso (863)   6,137
Somalia AMISOM (AU) Jan. 2007 Uganda (6,223), Burundi (5,432), Kenya (4,652) 18,117
South Sudan UNMISS (UN) Jul. 2011 Rwanda (1,001), Kenya (700), Rwanda (156)   7,327
Sudan (Abyei) UNISFA (UN) Jun. 2012 Ethiopia (3,925)   3,955
Sudan (Darfur) UNAMID (UN/AU) Jul. 2007 Rwanda (3,234), Ethiopia (2,551), Nigeria (2,536) 14,354
Source: “Opérations en cours,” Réseau de recherché sur les opérations de paix (ROP), Université de Montréal, accessed 2 
September 2014, http://www.operationspaix.net/operations-en-cours.html.
MISCA - International Support Mission to the Central African Republic
MONUSCO - United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
UNOCI - United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
ECOMIB - ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau
UNMIL - United Nations Mission in Liberia
MINUSMA - United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
AMISOM - African Union Mission in Somalia
UNMISS - United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNISFA - United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNAMID - AU/UN Mission in Darfur
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Nine states currently stand out, deploying more than 1,000 troops as peace-
keepers in a single multilateral operation (Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nige-
ria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda). Three of these states (Nigeria, 
Rwanda, and Ethiopia) deploy 1,000 or more peacekeepers in two operations 
while Uganda and Burundi have maintained over 5,000 troops each in the 
AMISOM mission in Somalia. (Remarkably, this has been done for the past sev-
eral years with no help from the international community.) This group of peace-
keeping, troop-contributing countries represents the principal hegemonic states 
in Africa. They are regular participants in multilateral military interventions on 
the continent, and the international community presently turns to them to help 
deal with some of the toughest trouble spots. In return, their actions are sup-
ported, and they are rewarded.
Interestingly, distinct patterns in organizational responsibility can be derived 
from the nine multilateral military interventions currently active in Africa (table 
3). There is a great deal of diversity in the organizational framework of the various 
missions. However, it is wrong to state, as Hikaru Yamashita points out, that 
“operational collaboration is a mission-to-mission cooperation in a specific con-
flict situation; as such, it is essentially ad hoc.”26 As we can see in table 3, although 
each of the current peacekeeping missions in Africa represents a unique situation, 
there are at least four reoccurring patterns. However, these arrangements are not 
ad hoc; neither do they simply involve a quick deployment of African regional or 
subregional forces that are then transformed into blue helmets.
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Table 3. Patterns in current peacekeeping operations in Africa
Mission Type Mission Name Organizer
Target State Key African Intervener(s)
Pattern 1 UN Mission MONUSCO UN DRC
South Africa, 
Tanzania
UNMISS UN South Sudan Rwanda
UNISFA UN Sudan (Abyei) Ethiopia
Pattern 2 Transfer Mission UNOCI ECOWAS -> UN
Côte d’Ivoire Niger
UNMIL ECOWAS -> UN
Liberia Nigeria
MINUSMA ECOWAS -> AU -> UN
Mali Chad, Togo, Niger, Burkina Faso
MISCA CEEAC -> AU
Central African 
Republic
Republic of Congo, 
Rwanda, Burundi, 
Chad
Pattern 3 Hybrid Mission UNAMID AU/UN Sudan (Darfur)
Rwanda, Ethiopia, 
Nigeria
Pattern 4 Regional/Subregional Mission AMISOM AU
Somalia Uganda, Kenya, Burundi
ECOMIB ECOWAS Guinea-Bissau
Nigeria, Burkina 
Faso
Source: “Opérations en cours,” Réseau de recherché sur les opérations de paix (ROP), Université de Montréal, accessed 2 
September 2014, http://www.operationspaix.net/operations-en-cours.html.
CEEAC - Economic Community of Central African States
First, three of the 10 interventions—MONUSCO (in the DRC), UNMISS 
(in South Sudan), and UNISFA (in the contested Abyei region)—are strictly UN 
PKOs. They originated as such and did not involve a transfer of authority from 
any other subregional or regional African organization. Interestingly, though, we 
see several key aspiring African hegemons among the chief suppliers of troops: 
South Africa in MONUSCO, Rwanda in UNMISS, and Ethiopia in UNISFA. 
However, one of these deployments stands out. Ethiopia is playing a substantial 
role by serving in the Abyei area, a flash point on the border between Sudan and 
South Sudan. There, Addis Ababa currently has committed more than 3,000 of its 
own troops to defend this crucial mission. Ethiopia is UNISFA’s biggest con-
tributor by far, with over 99 percent of the troops (3,925 of 3,955).27
Furthermore, four PKOs in Africa have seen a transfer of operational control 
from a subregional body to AU or UN control. They include UNOCI (in the Côte 
d’Ivoire), UNMIL (in Liberia), MINUSMA (in Mali), and MISCA (in the Cen-
tral African Republic). Interestingly, three of these four transfer missions have 
been between the West African body ECOWAS and the UN. This is not surpris-
ing since ECOWAS has significant experience in PKOs in the subregion, begin-
ning in August 1990 with the deployment during the Liberian civil war.
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The third pattern that one can derive from the current multilateral military 
interventions in Africa is the hybrid mission between the UN and AU in the 
Sudanese region of Darfur. This operation began as a purely AU mission because 
decisive action by the UN Security Council became bogged down by obstructive 
vetoes from China and Russia, considerably slowing action by the international 
community. Interestingly, three African states—Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Nigeria—
have been major contributors of armed personnel to this operation and have 
sought to stop the Sudanese government and its various militia proxies from per-
petrating genocide against the people of Darfur.
The fourth and final pattern includes the examples of AMISOM and 
ECOMIB—purely regional or subregional missions. ECOMIB is a rather small, 
limited operation, but AMISOM is currently the second largest deployment of 
troops in Africa, just behind the UN MONUSCO operation in the DRC. Some 
perhaps unexpected African actors contribute the bulk of AMISOM’s forces. Al-
though it may be understandable that Kenya has become actively involved in 
AMISOM, the direct interests and motivations of Uganda and Burundi are less 
clear. In reality, these two countries have been, by far, the most significant con-
tributors of peacekeeping troops in Somalia over the past several years. They have 
also received rather significant support from the international community for 
their commitment to the AMISOM mission.
Out of the patterns in the various multilateral military interventions in Af-
rica today, we see the emergence of a number of “subregional hegemons.”28 
Clearly, the unequal distribution of power among the nations of Africa is ex-
pressed clearly in troop commitment levels for PKOs.29 These African hegemons 
are states that have a primacy of power in regard to the nations around them. They 
have the structural power that allows them to play a central role in their subre-
gional or even the greater African regional system.30 These subregional hegemons 
possess disproportionate military and economic power as well as influence relative 
to that of other states in their neighborhood.
Based on their peacekeeping deployments, nine African states are notable: 
Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, and 
Uganda. Many of these countries with significant peacekeeping commitments 
indicate an active, emerging, or aspiring hegemon. Yet, while it is easy to  point to 
South Africa and Nigeria as natural leaders in Africa because of their dispropor-
tionate military and economic power and influence, a number of additional 
emerging hegemonic powers are playing important roles in their respective subre-
gions and beyond.31 Table 4 compares these key African actors.
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Table 4. Profiles of subregional hegemons
Military 
Expenditure 
(current 
millions of 
US dollars) 
(SIPRI)- 2012
Total Armed 
Forces 
(thousands) 
(WDI)-2012
GNI / per Capita 
(current interna-
tional dollars) 
(WDI)- 2012
GNI @ PPP 
(current inter-
national dollars 
in billions) 
(WDI)-2012
Population 
(millions) 
(WDI)-2012
Burundi      59 51      550     5.4    9.8
Chad    242 35   1,620   20.1   12.4
Ethiopia    381 138   1,110  101.5   91.7
Kenya    798 29   1,730   74.4   43.2
Nigeria 2,327 162   2,400 404.8 168.8
Rwanda      80 35   1,320   15.1    11.5
South Africa 4,470 62 10,780 563.3   52.3
Tanzania    319 28   1,560   72.4    47.8
Uganda    288 47   1,300    47.1   36.3
Subgroup 
Average    996 65   2,486 144.9   52.6
Sub-Saharan 
African 
Average
   545 39   2,240   42.6   19
Source: “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” SIPRI, 2012, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database; 
and “World Development Indicators,” World Bank, 2012, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
SIPRI - Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
WDI - World Development Indicator (World Bank)
GNI - gross national income
PPP - purchasing power parity
Fascinatingly, the key subregional hegemonic nations share some common-
alities. Yet, at the same time, one finds some interesting differences among the 
members of group. According to the literature, the African states most likely to 
deploy substantial numbers of  peacekeepers typically have large populations, are 
poor, and have big militaries.32 The descriptive statistics in table 4, however, indi-
cate that this is only partially true. First, African peacekeepers are predominantly 
from countries with large populations, at least by African standards (six of nine 
are above the African average). Second, the emergent hegemons sending peace-
keeping troops have economies more than three times as great as the African av-
erage although the data in the table is somewhat skewed by the relatively substan-
tial economies of Nigeria and South Africa. That is to say, five of the nine states in 
table 4 have armed forces bigger than the African average. Interestingly, besides 
South Africa and Nigeria, the other key peacekeepers on the continent are well 
below the 2012 World Bank World Development Indicator average of $2,240 per 
capita gross national income (in current international dollars at purchasing power 
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parity). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, about half of the emergent African 
hegemons that send peacekeepers in any significant number have larger-than-
average armies while only three of nine spend above the 2012 African average on 
their militaries. Interestingly, the descriptive statistics in table 4 contradict the 
generalizations of Jonah Victor.33 Some interveners are poor, but some are not. 
Several, like Nigeria and Ethiopia, have large populations, but others, such as 
Burundi, Chad, and Rwanda, do not. This group is much more heterogeneous 
than many people expect. Such a compelling point needs to be explored in future 
research.
Furthermore, corresponding with their relatively high levels of military 
spending and big armed forces, three African hegemons are prominent: Ethiopia 
in East Africa / Horn of Africa, Nigeria in West Africa, and South Africa in 
Southern Africa. Understandably, these three key actors seem the most capable of 
sending their troops as peacekeepers into conflicts on the continent. Furthermore, 
Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa have some of the most substantial economies 
in Africa south of the Sahara. This economic capacity also permits them to be 
active in various multilateral military interventions in Africa, sometimes several at 
the same time. Most intriguingly, though, three relatively smaller (in terms of 
economy and population, at least) African Great Lakes states of Burundi, Rwanda, 
and Uganda are also some of the most active participants in peacekeeping on the 
continent. These contradictions again suggest that a varied group of actors is in-
terested in playing important roles in building African security infrastructures.
Conclusion
Participation in PKOs not only reveals the relatively stronger states but also 
actively facilitates their ascendance. This role of the international community in 
the rise of these nations also needs further exploration. The major powers (besides 
France, perhaps) in the international community do not want to commit their 
own armed forces in any overt way, but they do play an active role in training and 
supplying those African states that do intervene. The African subregional hege-
mons “like a sheriff . . . must demonstrate capacity and political will to gather a 
posse in defense of mutual regional security interests.”34 Once they do so, the 
funding flows in. Increasingly, the international community has tried to bolster 
the response capacity of these emerging African subregional hegemonic states. To 
build their capabilities, extra-African actors in the international community have 
assisted by financing interventions in Africa and enhancing the capacity of local 
actors to intervene. However, although a number of foreign-aid programs exist to 
help facilitate interventions by these African subregional hegemons into various 
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crises on the continent, the burden of trying to resolve a number of the planet’s 
most intractable conflicts remains on some of the poorest states in the world.
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